Re: IPR: analysis of Microsoft patent applications
Douglas Otis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Sat, 2004-09-18 at 04:34, Roy Badami wrote: > >>>>> "David" == David Woodhouse <[email protected]> writes: > > David> When considered holistically, the domain/IP verification > David> schemes don't actually manage to achieve anything more than > David> CSV does -- they only give a way to determine how much to > David> trust the individual mail server which is offering the > David> mail. > > I don't think that's true. The domain/IP verification schemes > directly address forgery, in a way that CSV doesn't. Think about > Sender ID as a tool for senders who (for whatever reason) want to be > able to prevent others from sending forged mail claiming to be from > them. When financial institutions use consistent EHLO names for their MTAs and validated EHLO names are presented to users, then this too serves to foil forgeries. This depends upon users being able to recognize these names through their normal correspondence. The marid-mpr draft was to illustrate a simple name list could be used to confirm the message is within the nominal mail channel. The advantages using CSV/MPR over Sender-ID are as follows: a) The RFC2822 From will be marked out of the nominal mail channel irrespective of any other headers. b) A single DNS lookup is required to obtain the mailbox domain/MTA association. c) Phase-in is safer with reliance upon the EHLO name and not the mailbox domain. Until seen, there is no increased expectations. d) The EHLO is stronger, and more difficult to spoof than Sender-ID and allows for reputations to be safely asserted. e) Reputation assertions upon the EHLO name- 1) Isolate problems where this is not true for Sender-ID. 2) Does not constrain the use of the mailbox domain allowing provider choice. 3) Protects consumers from lax providers tarnishing their reputation. 4) Allows mailbox domain associations to safely be open without inviting spoofing exploits. > As a tool for recipients, Sender ID and CSV both provide a hook on > which to hang reputation and accreditation systems, and I'm agnostic > as to which will work better in the real world, though my feeling is > that they may in fact turn out to be complementary. Sender-ID does not provide a safe hook for reputation assertions nor does it provide good forgery protection as it can be easily spoofed. -Doug