Re: A new SMTP "3821" [Re: FTC stuff...........]
David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, 2004-12-07 at 16:34 -0500, Alan DeKok wrote: > SPF validates the use of a name in MAIL FROM for *any* > hop. CSV validates that an SMTP client is affiliated with a domain > name it's using in EHLO. > > The validations are orthogonal, because they are validating > different fields which do not have to be correlated. In the SPF advocates' imaginary world where SRS is common, there's a _much_ stronger correlation between the two validations than there is in the real world today. > The issue SES has that RMX doesn't is that the cryptographic tokens > it uses can be copied. e.g. Grab tokens from somewhere, and for a > short period of time, use them to send spam to third parties. While > there are ways to fix this issue, most involve a re-thinking of what > we mean by "sending email". Some do. SES allows the sender to encode a message-digest in the reverse-path to prevent the replay attack. I probably wouldn't describe that option as 're-thinking' but I've entertained too many pointless debates on terminology (in particular 'forgery') to bother to try to ask precisely what you mean by that word. > > "its name". But yes. The question is how you identify that traffic. > > Use of the name in a field in a protocol. e.g. EHLO or MAIL FROM. Right. And it doesn't necessarily matter _which_ name as long as you can be sure the sending party is really supposed to be using that name. Which is why I don't agree with you that they're entirely orthogonal. They're different, it's true; but what they achieve in the long run is basically the same. > Cryptographic approaches solve a lot of problems inherent in > IP-based approaches, because they tie authentication to identity, and > not to location. Right. The cryptographic approaches make a lot more sense, as far as I can tell. -- dwmw2