Re: A new SMTP "3821" [Re: FTC stuff...........]

You had claimed:

> The point is in order to accomplish this, the CSV (and others) state

> machine must be based on a delay design mechanism.

This is totally false, and is not supported at all by your 15K post, 
which I have slogged through.

I am familiar with your claim that one MUST wait 'till RCPT TO: to do 
any validation.  It's a false claim.

Certainly doing so might be more efficient. That's not a false claim.



Re. Mixed policies discussion:

1)It's CSV, not CVS. 
2)What part of

> This is out of scope for CSV.  IIRC, you've produced a doc that 
> addresses this scope (or "presumes to", to use your own words) for a 
> certain set of policies; it could could be revised to encompass CSV. 
> CSV does not purport to do the coupling you claim it does not do 
> properly. 

do you not understand?

We are in what's called 'violent agreement'.  We AGREE: CSV must be 
considered in the reality of mixed policies. CSV *ITSELF* does not do 
so, however.
We AGREE: doing the checks that are least costly first (which MAY mean 
delaying validation) is a good idea!

In terms of the specific mixed policy issues you raised:
One only trusts Accredidation and Reputation services that one feels are 
Reputable!  If the USA's DMA runs such a service, I doubt many folks 
will trust it!

>> Should ELVEY.COM get blacklisted? or should a report be sent?
>
IMO, a blacklist that blacklists based on a delivery attempt *without 
having seen the content of the email, and therefore having no good way 
to know whether it was UBE* should not be trusted; there are legitimate 
reasons for CBV failures, IMO.  So IMO, no.  But again, let me 
re-emphasise, this is not part of the CSV protocol, and does not belong 
in it.  It probably belongs in a BCP around usage.  If a Accredidation 
and Reputation services maintainer feels that there are no legitimate 
reasons for CBV failures, ever, then Yes, the maintainer should ding 
elvey.com in the scenario you describe.  I believe there is consensus 
among abuse desks that email abuse reports that don't include the header 
and body of the email are unlikely to be given much, if any weight.