RE: blowback, was A new SMTP "3821" [Re: FTC stuff...........]
Dean Anderson <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, 10 Jan 2005 [email protected] wrote: > > > From: Dean Anderson [mailto:[email protected]] > > On Sun, 9 Jan 2005 [email protected] wrote: > > > > > > > > Agreed, but near sighted. If the sending MTA had done some > > sort of validation to ensure the message > > > was not forged when it accepted it, then we wouldn't have a > > blowback problem. You cannot blame > > > subsequent MTA's in the path for detecting and rejecting > > bad email when its something the first hop > > > MTA could (and should) have done in the first place! > > > > And just what sort of validation would that be? > > Authentication (SMTP AUTH, POP-before-SMTP, etc.), restriction to > trusted IP addresses, etc. Basically the sending server is responsible > for authorizing its own use, via whatever method is most appropriate. None of the things you listed indicate prevent forgery. Server authorization is not related to forgery. As I pointed out, Closed relays are "authorized", but one can still forge emails. SMTP AUTH and Pop-before-SMTP don't prevent forgery, either. As I already pointed you, you keep forgetting that every abuser is someone's customer, and so has access to relay facilities. Those facilities cannot prevent forgery. -- Av8 Internet Prepared to pay a premium for better service? www.av8.net faster, more reliable, better service 617 344 9000