RE: So here it is one year later...

> [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of wayne

> Despite asking several times on the MASS mailing list, I have 
> yet to see any data on the false positive rates for DK, IIM, 
> William's DK-IIM merged system, CSV, or SES.  So far, all 
> I've seen is people claiming that their systems work better 
> than SPF, with no data to back it up. (Often, there is data 
> to back up the claim that SPF has false positives, but we 
> *do* know that.)

They certainly work better in certain circumstances, but at this point I
would not want to publish any data because I don't know how typical those
circumstances and in any case the issue is irrelevant.

DK and SPF have different failure modes. I don't think this is a competition
situation. A system with both schemes is much more effective than either on
its own.

Sure if we started from scratch we would only have one auth scheme. We are
retrofitting a legacy system so expect some pain and duplicated effort.

Both systems can do much better if we present them as a coherent integrated
plan than if we make the mistake of having a standards war. If you think
that is a good idea then Jon Callas and I can tell you just how great the
PGP/SMIME standards war was for both of our companies.


	Phill