Re: So here it is one year later...
David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, 2005-02-01 at 00:20 -0800, Douglas Otis wrote: > > What are the security concerns of which you speak? > > This was raised on the CLEAR mailing list by William Leibzon and > responded to by Tony Finch. Follow the thread. > > http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-clear/2004-November/000133.html Ah yes; I had seen that but discarded it as irrelevant in the context of BATV -- BATV alone doesn't really offer the _recipient_ much benefit along those lines anyway. Referring to the examples in message 000146.html, it's obvious that with BATV the attacker could just send a mail from 'batv=INVALIDBATVTAG/victim@domain' anyway, and the recipient would have no means to validate that. In the context of SES it's slightly more relevant, but really not by far. It involves a naïve user actually looking in the message headers for the reverse-path and _incorrectly_ identifying it as an SES localpart, thus having faith in it. (If the MUA were to be modified to show SES/BATV reverse-paths more prominently, of course it wouldn't have the false positives that wetware can have). In general, users don't do that. Either they're capable of telling the difference, or they're not going to be looking in the headers for it anyway. The middle ground is relatively rare. It also involves the domain owner/admin actually permitting that kind of reverse-path to be used in outgoing mail, and authorising it as valid if it's sent from elsewhere. -- dwmw2