Re: Trouble with Sender Authentication
Douglas Otis <[email protected]> Wed, 8 Nov 2006 11:23:12 -0800
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Nov 7, 2006, at 4:27 PM, Julian Mehnle wrote: > > The problem with your analysis, Doug, is that (1) it attributes > several attack vectors to SPF which are really orthogonal, like > SMTP's multi-recipient feature or the use of many compromised > systems for sending mail, and (2) with a high probability it > overrates both the negative effects (like the victim/attacker > traffic ratio) of an attack staged as described, and the net > incentive for doing so in the first place. Execution of SPF script is not orthogonal to SMTP's current use (or abuse). An SPF script exploit requiring little (if any) resources of the attacker offers an incentive. Difficult forensics offers an incentive. Acceptance of responsibility and subsequent changes to infrastructure requires time. The delay for an effective response offers an incentive. These incentives and risks grow as SPF script execution increases. Protection necessitates the general removal of the related scripts. Malicious script detection at each DNS is not reasonable. -Doug