Re: requirements and the security considerations
h chan <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.nemo |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <6E31144C030982429702B11D6746B98C370928BF@szxeml557-mbx.china.huawei.com> |
Can anyone please reply to this:
Text suggested by Byoung-Jo:
REQ6: Security considerations
DMM protocol solutions MUST consider security risks introduced
by DMM into the network. Examples of such risks to be
considered may include authentication and authorization mechanisms
that allow a mobile host/router to use the mobility
support provided by the DMM solution; redirecting traffic to
the wrong host when providing DMM support; signaling message
protection for authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
Motivation: Various attacks such as impersonation, denial of
service, man-in-the-middle attacks, and so on, may become newly
possible or easier to mount due to the introduction of DMM. Proof
of possession of past and new IP addresses may be needed
For comparison, text in version 5 is
REQ6: Security considerations
DMM protocol solutions MUST consider security risks introduced
by DMM into the network. Such considerations may include
authentication and authorization mechanisms that allow a
mobile host/router to use the mobility support provided by the
DMM solution; measures against redirecting traffic to the
wrong host when providing DMM support; signaling message
protection for authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
Motivation: Various attacks such as impersonation, denial of
service, man-in-the-middle attacks, and so on, may become
newly possible or easier to mount due to the introduction of
DMM. Proof of possession of past and new IP addresses may be
needed.
Signaling messages can be subject to various attacks since
they carry critical context information about a mobile node/
router. For instance, a malicious node can forge a number of
signaling messages thus redirecting traffic from its
legitimate path. Consequently, the specific node is under a
denial of service attack, whereas other nodes do not receive
their traffic. As signaling messages may travel over the
Internet, end-to-end security between communicating hosts must
H Anthony Chan
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of h chan
Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2013 7:15 PM
To: Jouni Korhonen; [email protected]; KIM, BYOUNG-JO J (BYOUNG-JO
Cc: Jong-Hyouk Lee
Subject: Re: [DMM] requirements and the security considerations
The comments from Byoung-Jo Kim to REQ6 and Section 6 in version 4 were the following:
There are too much text in the security REQ6 that are vague and too wide.
And Section 6. Security considerations should say "none", 'cause that's usually the section that discusses security considerations related to the draft itself. Since this is a requirement draft, there is no such thing.
There is a separate requirement earlier to cover security issues due to DMM.
REQ6: Security considerations
DMM protocol solutions MUST consider security risks introduced
by DMM into the network. Examples of such risks to be
considered may include authentication and authorization mechanisms
that allow a mobile host/router to use the mobility
support provided by the DMM solution; redirecting traffic to
the wrong host when providing DMM support; signaling message
protection for authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
Motivation: Various attacks such as impersonation, denial of
service, man-in-the-middle attacks, and so on, may become newly
possible or easier to mount due to the introduction of DMM. Proof
of possession of past and new IP addresses may be needed.
H Anthony Chan
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Jouni Korhonen
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 2:40 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [DMM] requirements and the security considerations
<no co-chair cap/bowler>
Folks,
I have been reading Section 6 Security Considerations:
It is necessary to provide sufficient defense against possible
security attacks, or to adopt existing security mechanisms and
protocols to provide sufficient security protections. For instance,
EAP-based authentication can be used for access network security,
while IPsec can be used for end-to-end security.
I think this text still deserves some tweaking. First, "provide sufficient defense against possible security attacks".. against whom?
Second, should the text say something that the DMM protocol itself must not be usable as a tool to launch an attack by a malicious mobile node that happens to know that it is attached to a network implementing DMM and knows (somehow) how the DMM protocol functions?
- Jouni
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