Re: AD Evaluation: draft-ietf-dmm-requirements

h chan <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.nemo
Message-ID <6E31144C030982429702B11D6746B98C370EBAFD@szxeml557-mbx.china.huawei.com>
Alex,
There are some examples in the motivation following REQ6. Do you think the rouge route example is included in the "redirecting traffic from its legitimate path" or should it be added as a separate example?

   REQ6:  Security considerations

          A DMM solution MUST NOT introduce new security risks, or
          amplify existing security risks, that cannot be mitigated by
          existing security mechanisms or protocols.

          Motivation: Various attacks such as impersonation, denial of
          service, man-in-the-middle attacks, and so on, may be launched
          in a DMM deployment.  For instance, an illegitimate node may
          attempt to access a network providing DMM.  Another example is
          that a malicious node can forge a number of signaling messages
          thus redirecting traffic from its legitimate path.
          Consequently, the specific node is under a denial of service
          attack, whereas other nodes do not receive their traffic.
          Accordingly, security mechanisms/protocols providing access
          control, integrity, authentication, authorization,
          confidentiality, etc. can be used to protect the DMM entities
          as they are already used to protect against existing networks
          and existing mobility protocols defined in IETF.

   This requirement prevents a DMM solution from introducing
   uncontrollable problems of potentially insecure mobility management
   protocols which make deployment infeasible because platforms
   conforming to the protocols are at risk for data loss and numerous
   other dangers, including financial harm to the users.

H Anthony Chan

-----Original Message-----
From: dmm [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Alexandru Petrescu
Sent: Friday, January 31, 2014 5:45 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [DMM] AD Evaluation: draft-ietf-dmm-requirements

Le 31/01/2014 00:18, Jouni Korhonen a écrit :
>
> On Jan 29, 2014, at 5:56 AM, Brian Haberman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
>>
>> The above seems a little clunky.  Does this work for everyone?
>>
>>
>> A DMM solution MUST NOT introduce new security risks, or amplify 
>> existing security risks, that cannot be mitigated by existing 
>> security mechanisms or protocols.
>
>
> Would work for me.

To me this is too hig-level.

IT's a good principle that we apply everywhere and it works.

But I wonder there is some detail about it.

Like for example: any new DMM solution involving route updates will not allow rogue routes to be inserted in the system.

Alex

>
> - Jouni
>
>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Brian
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dmm mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmm
>
>


_______________________________________________
dmm mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmm
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.