Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls04
Chuck Lever <[email protected]> Fri, 6 Dec 2019 14:11:52 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.nfsv4 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> On Dec 6, 2019, at 11:53 AM, David Noveck <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 10:28 AM Tom Talpey <[email protected]> wrote: > > -----Original Message----- > > From: nfsv4 <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Chuck Lever > > Sent: Friday, December 6, 2019 10:11 AM > > To: David Noveck <[email protected]> > > Cc: NFSv4 <[email protected]> > > Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [nfsv4] Review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls04 >> Essentially, we want to require that the host separates >> the encryption of each tenant's traffic. > > I think the move from "user identiy domain" to "tenant" is helpful here even > though you would have to explain what multipe tenants, which, as Tom > points out, can alsooccur without virtalization per se, bein involved. Fair 'nuf. To me "tenant" and "user identity domain" mean the same thing in this context. In Linux, a tenant container is represented by a set of namespaces, one of which controls the user identity mapping. So "user identity domain" seems natural to me, but maybe not to others. RFC 4949 does not have a convenient definition of "tenant." RFC 7644 Section 6 comes close. David Black, perhaps you might have thoughts based on your work on network virtualization overlays ( RFCs 736[45] )? >> I don't think this is limited to a virtualization environment, or the behavior >> of the host partition/process. It's more generally a matter of key management, >> isn't it? > > That seems right to me. > > >> The more general statement in that case might be that the key(s) used to >> protect the TLS connections MUST be managed in such a way that do not >> impact the privacy or integrity of one another. For example, if Coke and Pepsi >> were both guests of a single host, the keys used for their RPC/TLS mounts >> MUST NOT allow Coke to attack Pepsi. > > Good requirement but I think it needs to be stated in terms of what the > implementation is to do, rather than what it needs to prevent. I agree that this has become implementation guidance. But I'm still not clear on exactly how to state this recommendation/requirement. For one thing, the use of compliance keywords might no longer be appropriate. -- Chuck Lever _______________________________________________ nfsv4 mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4