[openpgp] Re: pure vs. pre-hash in FIPS 204 and 205

Daniel Huigens wrote in
 <4e9oBXl8Mu7-Fcj3fn0UssCr_qyeZFhmgvf9CzVEw4-ueyG5h678x4P3x04DrTznZQs88Mc\
 [email protected]>:
 |Hi Simo,
 |
 |You're making an argument that goes roughly as follows:
 |
 |- I don't understand the purpose of HashML-DSA as described in FIPS 204
 |- Therefore I assume the purpose must be something else, and interpret
 |  the text of FIPS 204 differently to fit that assumption
 |- The purpose I assume is the one that would be relevant for OpenPGP
 |- Therefore we should use HashML-DSA for OpenPGP
 |
 |IMHO, this is faulty reasoning. If you don't understand the purpose
 |of HashML-DSA, that's fine. I don't see it as my job to justify the
 |existence of HashML-DSA for something other than being used in OpenPGP.
 |For all I care it might be completely useless and nobody implements it,
 |like what happened with the pre-hash variants of EdDSA.
 |
 |In any case I prefer to take the text in FIPS 204 at face value, and
 |the straightforward reading of the text says that we shouldn't use it.
 |
 |
 |> The explanation in 5.4, the whole point of providing a pre-hash ML-DSA
 |> version is to allow application to doh!) "pre" Hash the message.
 |
 |That's not what it says. It says: "Like ML-DSA, the signing algorithm of
 |HashML-DSA takes the content to be signed, the private key, and a
 |context as input, as well as a hash function or XOF that is to be used
 |to pre-hash the content to be signed."
 |So it's the HashML-DSA function itself that pre-hashes the content.
 |
 |> What would be the point of doing that, and then re-hashing the whole
 |> thing a second time ? (and then a third time internally).
 |
 |Indeed you wouldn't. That's why it says "If the content is *not* hashed
 |at the application level, the pre-hash version of ML-DSA signing may be
 |used." (emphasis mine)
 |
 |> If you are still unconvinced look at the text at the bottom of Page 20
 |> which says explicitly: "As with the pre-hash signature generation, 𝑀 ′
 |> may be constructed outside of the cryptographic module that performs
 |> ML-DSA.Verify_internal."
 |
 |The text after your quote continues "However, in the case of HashML-DSA,
 |the hash or XOF of the content must be computed within a FIPS 140-
 |validated cryptographic module, which may be a different cryptographic
 |module than the one that performs ML-DSA.Verify_internal."
 |
 |Like I said, you might have a "core cryptographic module" that's on an
 |HSM, and a different cryptographic module that computes the hash.
 |
 |> for the non-FIPS language versed "Outside the cryptographic module" ==
 |> "The application"
 |
 |So no, in this case they mean "in a different cryptographic module".
 |
 |> I know that OpenPGP does not do that, but NIST puts down general rules
 |> to follow that cover all cases. That is the spirit of the
 |> specification, and yes if you "hold it right" you can be safe using
 |> Pure ML-DSA, but why go against the spirit and the recommendation of
 |> the spec when it is rather easy to actually follow the spec and use the
 |> correct function which is HashML-DSA ?
 |
 |You still haven't actually quoted a recommendation of the spec.
 |The only relevant recommendation I see is: "In general, the “pure”
 |ML-DSA version is preferred."
 |
 |> They would not have made available HashML-DSA if there weren't
 |> legitimate cases for it.
 |
 |Like the text I quoted above says, "If the content is not hashed at the
 |application level, the pre-hash version of ML-DSA signing may be used."
 |So the exact opposite case of OpenPGP.
 |
 |
 |Btw, if your position is that you _disagree_ with NIST and/or FIPS 204,
 |like some parts of your email seem to suggest, that's perfectly fine,
 |but that's something entirely different than claiming that the spec
 |recommends something different than what it actually recommends.
 |
 |Best,
 |Daniel
 |
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--steffen
|
|Der Kragenbaer,                The moon bear,
|der holt sich munter           he cheerfully and one by one
|einen nach dem anderen runter  wa.ks himself off
|(By Robert Gernhardt)
|
|In Fall and Winter, feel "The Dropbear Bard"s pint(er).
|
|The banded bear
|without a care,
|Banged on himself for e'er and e'er
|
|Farewell, dear collar bear

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