[openpgp] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementke y-02.txt

Andrew Gallagher <[email protected]> Mon, 27 Jan 2025 16:55:15 +0000

Newsgroups	gmane.ietf.openpgp
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

On 27 Jan 2025, at 16:37, Daniel Huigens <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>>>> B might want to state "I am a replacement for A". But in doing so, B forms an equivalence binding with A and legitimates the use of A's subkeys. Do we need a possibility to state "I replace this key but I don't want anyone to use it as fallback”?
> 
> I'm not sure this makes sense to me; can't/shouldn't I just revoke or expire key A in that case?

If you have the secret key material to A, yes that would be a better method. Unfortunately loss of secret key material is still a common occurrence. And publishing an escrowed (hard) revocation would invalidate both the forward replacement subpacket and any historical signatures, so a user may not wish to avail of that option.

> Also, A will only be used as a fallback to B if the sending implementation doesn't support key B. Is there any use case to being able to say something like, "existing correspondents may continue to communicate with me using key A, but new correspondents (looking up my key from a keyserver) must use key B, even if they don't support it"? That seems like a strange request to me.

It might be preferable for encryption to fail at the compose stage, instead of apparently succeeding only for decryption to fail at the receiving end?

A

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