[openpgp] Re: Certificate discovery over HKP

Andrew Gallagher <[email protected]> Wed, 9 Apr 2025 10:56:44 +0100

Newsgroups	gmane.ietf.openpgp
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

On 9 Apr 2025, at 10:40, Daniel Huigens <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> So the only difference here is that the attack is silent also for the
> sender, in the sense that they will still see that the message will be
> encrypted, if they trust the keyserver. Perhaps that's still significant
> in the sense that they might be more willing to send sensitive data in
> an encrypted email (but then again, you could argue that in that case
> they should verify the key first).

Agreed, but we’ve spent enough time telling people to look for lock icons that a significant number of them will behave differently when the lock icon appears - in which case we’re giving them a false sense of security. Sure, they *should* verify out of band, but how many will in practice?

And I do appreciate that the same argument applies to DANE etc. over DNS-non-SEC. But it's a regression when compared to WKD over TLS.

A

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