[openpgp] PQC: ML-DSA only (non-composite) signature
Roberto Hueso Gomez <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.openpgp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi everyone! Cryptography newbie here, so this proposal might not make sense at this stage, but I think it's worth discussing :) I also created a GitHub issue: https://github.com/openpgp-pqc/draft-openpgp-pqc/issues/220 The use case is: Signing messages and software using ML-DSA-87 to comply with CNSA 2.0 [1] (see "Table: Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0") using keys stored in an HSM. In its current state, this draft forces us to use a composite signature ML-DSA-87+Ed448. A significant portion of HSMs are not able to sign using Ed448. In this particular use case, continuing to use RSA signing because of software/HSM compatibility reasons is a "must", so that means that triple signing would be needed (i.e. ML-DSA-87+Ed448 and RSA-4096). Also for compliance reasons with CNSA 1.0 [2]. Another concern is that, according to section 3.3 [3], "Newer implementations with PQ(/T) support MAY ignore the traditional signature(s) during validation." but there is no ML-DSA-only signature scheme defined. Would it make sense to have an ML-DSA-87 only (non-composite) signature in this draft where you also advice to use it together with a classical signature algorithm but don't specify which one? (i.e. 2 independent OpenPGP signatures) Beyond this particular use case, I believe it adds some flexibility to OpenPGP and makes it more future-proof. Thank you! Roberto. [1] https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF [2] https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/15/2002874275/-1/-1/0/CNSA_WORKSHEET_20211015.PDF [3] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-11.html#name-multiple-signatures _______________________________________________ openpgp mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]