[openpgp] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-sy mmetric-keys-02.txt
Daniel Huigens <[email protected]> Wed, 05 Nov 2025 07:24:14 +0000
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On Tuesday, November 4th, 2025 at 19:46, andrewg <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2025-11-04 16:26, Daniel Huigens wrote: > > > I realized that no, we don't, we could simply use AEAD as a MAC, too, > > by passing the input as additional data, and the empty string as the > > message to encrypt. > > That is very clever, I like it. ;-) Thanks :) > > If we really want to introduce HMAC or KMAC at a later date after all > > for whatever reason, plenty of nobs remain to do so, such as in a new > > packet or packet version, or a new algorithm ID anyway, and so on. > > I think we should pick an extensibility mechanism sooner rather than > later. If we register the special asymmetric code point 0, then IMO this > implies that future extensibility will be marked by packet version > bumps. I don't think this is necessarily true. If we define algorithm ID 0 as AEAD, then the most natural point of extension is the AEAD algorithm registry. For example, if we define ChaCha20-Poly1305 there, then we gain a new encryption mode and a new MAC (Poly1305) for free. I don't think we'll ever really need more extensibility than that, so defining an additional registry seems overkill. If we want to, we could even define HMAC or KMAC as a "MAC-only AEAD", with an IV size of 0 and a tag size of 256. But even that doesn't seem super necessary. Best, Daniel _______________________________________________ openpgp mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]