[openpgp] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gall agher-openpgp-media-types-00.txt
Andrew Gallagher <[email protected]> Thu, 11 Dec 2025 10:47:47 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.openpgp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi, Daniel! On 10/12/2025 20:17, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Tue 2025-12-09 23:36:30 +0000, Andrew Gallagher wrote: >> Right, so the distinction isn't strictly required in the email use >> case. > > Really? Or are you saying this because the only sensible way to sign a > message is with unobtrusive signatures, and there would never be any > reason to put anything other than an encrypted message in its own MIME > part? I'm saying there is no spec for putting anything other than an encrypted message inside a multipart/encrypted container, so the (claimed) content-type of the encrypted part adds no new information. Obtrusive signed messages use multipart/signed, not multipart/encrypted, so can already be distinguished at the application layer. > I certainly > wouldn't want a compressed-only (or worse, a literal-only) pgp message > to be considered acceptable content for an e-mail message that otherwise > appears to be encrypted. Neither would I - but as I said, the multipart/encrypted container already requires that the content is an encrypted message. If receiving implementations don't test for this already, a content-type header won't force them to. >> While this would be simpler at the implementation level, I'm not >> convinced it would add any user-facing benefits - and giving up MIME >> entirely might cause new problems with legacy systems. > > But the proposal to change the Content-Type subpart for RFC3156 > encrypted messages already causes problems with legacy systems. Some disruption will be unavoidable, but I'm trying to minimise the extra problems created. I fear that dispensing with RFC1847 structure will add additional problems on top of the unavoidable ones... > Anyway, i'm not talking about giving up MIME entirely. I'm talking > about simplifying an external MIME structure while actually committing > to MIME more explicitly for the internal structure. I do like this idea in the abstract, and if we were doing encrypted mail again from scratch we would probably do something like this instead of RFC1847 - but it would be a *much* bigger project. > It's a feature that Alice can take (for example) a text file she knows > is encrypted to Bob, and coerce Bob to decrypt it and treat its contents > as a message/822 object? > > I mean, that is the state of play today, but it seems unwise. Distinct content-types don't prevent it though, because Alice can claim any content-type she likes in the cleartext part. > I agree -- i'm talking about a MUA being able to distinguish between > "this is an encrypted MIME tree" and "this is encrypted but is not > (necessarily) a MIME tree". If it is a direct child part of a multipart/encrypted part then it is a MIME tree, otherwise it might not be. An MUA already has all the information it needs. > It occurs to me that to fix this problem safely, we might actually need > something cryptographically strong in the OpenPGP layer itself, not just > in the MIME layer. > > To try to establish what the desired API and semantics would be, I've > recorded this observation over at: > > https://gitlab.com/dkg/openpgp-stateless-cli/-/issues/142 I agree, context separation would be the only way to enforce it. Perhaps we should separate the threads at this point...? A _______________________________________________ openpgp mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]