WG LAST CALL on draft-ietf-ppvpn-as-vr-01.txt
Mark Duffy <[email protected]> Wed, 21 May 2003 18:44:13 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ppvpn |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <5.2.0.9.0.20030521183705.01fe3de8@email> |
Hi, here are comments on draft-ietf-ppvpn-as-vr-01.txt.
1. Introduction
[md] I would suggest adding the following to the list of situations for
which VR-based PPVPNs are well suited:
- The VPN service provider does not own a backbone network but
wishes to provide PPVPN services over a backbone obtained
from some other provider.
- Several cooperating SPs desire to offer PPVPN service at points
that span multiple administrataive domains of the backbone, perhaps
over the public Internet.
2.1. Auto Discovery
In the VR-based PPVPNS, various auto discovery mechanisms are
supported. VPN discovery can be achieved through directory servers,
[md] This should reference draft-heinanen-radius-pe-discovery-04.txt
BGP-based auto-discovery is described in [VPN-BGP], and is
used for membership, topology and reachability discovery.
[md] s/membership, topology and reachability/membership and topology/
(As discussed even in the following paragraph, BGP is not used for
reachability in this case.)
5. Access Control and Authentication
CE-PE authentication has not been specified for VR-based VPNs and is
for further study. The customer must provide appropriate mechanisms
for CE-PE authentication.
[md] This could go a little further by saying the same thing as the 2547
applic statement. From draft-ietf-ppvpn-as2547-01.txt sect. 5:
No particular means of PE/CE authentication is specified for 2547-
style VPNs. PE/CE mutual authentication may be done via any
mechanism supported by the routing protocol in which the CE and PE
are peers (e.g., use of the TCP MD5 authentication when the CE/PE
protocol is BGP), or by any other mechanism that may be desired.
Even with the use of IPsec, the security level offered is dependent
on the scope of the IPsec security associations: encrypting on a CE-
to-CE basis (as in CE-based VPNs) will offer a wider scope of
protection than only encrypting on a PE-to-PE basis (as in PE-based
VPNs), since the CE-PE link remains unencrypted in the latter case.
[md] ... However, PE-PE IPsec offers substantial offsetting advantages in
efficiency, outsourcing, and integration with the dynamic membership and
dynamic routing nature of the PPVPN. CE-PE IPsec can also be used to
protect traffic on the CE-PE section of the network. In this case the
traffic is only unprotected by IPsec within the PE device.
11. SP Routing
VR-based PPVPNs do not impose any additional requirements on the IGP
used in the service provider core network. However, the PE must
implement the IGP used in the customer VPN.
[md] I presume this refers to the PE implementing this IGP for use on the
CE-VR adjacency? This should be clarified if possible. Also, It may not
use an IGP there at all (could be BGP or static). Maybe the 2nd sentence
there can just be removed.
>From the customers viewpoint of routing topology, the SPs network
topology appears much simpler than it may actually be. Depending on
the VR implementation, the SPs service offering, and the SPs physical
topology, it may appear as either a single large router with
interfaces for each VPN site, as a full mesh, with two routers
between any two sites, as a hub-and spoke topology (when the customer
wants all inter-site traffic to pass through one or more specific
sites, for application of services such as security filtering), or
other arbitrary topology.
[md] This topology may be hidden from the customer or not, depending on
what routing protocols are used Vr-VR and VR-CE. In general, the customer
will see the VPN backbone topology (i.e. the topology of VRs operated by
the provider) ONLY in the case where a link-state IGP is used on the CE-VR
adjacency, and the same link-state IGP is used within the VPN backbone, and
the same instance of the IGP is used within the VPN backbone. So, except
under those special circumstances, the CE device will see only reachability
information, and not topology information.
14. QoS/SLA
QoS mechanisms developed for physical routers can be used with VRs,
on a per-VR basis. e.g., classification, policing, drop policies,
traffic shaping and scheduling/bandwidth reservation. The
architecture allows separate quality of service engineering of the
VPNs and the backbone.
[md] The above text appears twice in this section (paragraph 2 and
paragraph 3).
16.3. Customer Management of VR
Customer network management and troubleshooting systems will
generally have less ability to gather information from the VRs than
from the customers own routers, and will also have little or no
ability to directly change VR configurations. The customers systems
should be planned so as to accommodate the restricted capabilities of
the VRs to respond to customer network management processes.
[md] This above text is repeated in sect. 11 on p. 10.