Re: Registry lock - two-factor or intervention

Patrik Fältström <[email protected]> Sat, 21 Sep 2013 08:14:21 +0200
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.provreg
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On 21 sep 2013, at 07:53, Jay Daley <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 21/09/2013, at 1:52 AM, Patrik Fältström <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>>> If this is still the business justification (protection against a compromised Registrar), then there is a problem with facilitating turning on the Registry Lock via the EPP server.
>> 
>> Well, I see that as a potential denial of service attack. But my only point was that we should see the "Turn ON", "Turn OFF", "Make changes" as separate operations as they MIGHT require different mechanisms.
> 
> 
> There's quite a big risk here that a hacker compromises a registrar, switches a domain name to a compromised site and then locks the record, which makes undoing the malicious change much harder when the registrar regains control of their systems.

Correct, what I would say a "denial of service attack". :-P

My point is still that the various operations should be investigated individually. Nothing more, nothing less.

   Patrik

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