RE: Feedback on draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-06.txt
"Wijnen, Bert (Bert)" <[email protected]> Thu, 6 Nov 2003 23:00:40 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rap |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <7D5D48D2CAA3D84C813F5B154F43B15502D954ED@nl0006exch001u.nl.lucent.com> |
OK, that is good to hear. But was I supposed to just assume that based on the silence? Thanks, Bert > -----Original Message----- > From: Kulkarni, Amol [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: donderdag 6 november 2003 22:50 > To: Wijnen, Bert (Bert); Hahn, Scott; Mark Stevens (E-mail) > Cc: Rap-wg (E-mail); Uri Blumenthal (E-mail) > Subject: RE: Feedback on draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-06.txt > > > Bert, > > I AM working on modifying the draft to Uri's satisfaction. > > Amol > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf > Of Wijnen, Bert (Bert) > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 12:56 PM > To: Hahn, Scott; Mark Stevens (E-mail) > Cc: Rap-wg (E-mail); Uri Blumenthal (E-mail) > Subject: RE: Feedback on draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-06.txt > > I guess that it just alternates between the security advisor > and the WG (and/or eduitors/authors)... but now we've been waiting > for close to two weeks without any response from WG. > > <ad hat on> > This is not gonna work > I hope you understand the implied message here! > </ad hat on> > > Thanks, > Bert > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Wijnen, Bert (Bert) [mailto:[email protected]] > > Sent: maandag 27 oktober 2003 12:06 > > To: Rap-wg (E-mail) > > Cc: Uri Blumenthal (E-mail) > > Subject: Feedback on draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-06.txt > > > > > > Sorry for the long delay, but finally our Security Advisor has > > found time to review revision 6. > > > > I hope that the authors/editors and the WG can quickly > > respond and act, so that we can now get some pressure to > > complete this last RAP-WG document soon. > > > > Thanks, > > Bert > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Uri Blumenthal [mailto:[email protected]] > > Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2003 23:58 > > To: Wijnen, Bert > > Cc: Blumenthal, Uri > > Subject: COPS etc.3.2.1. So is at least one protocol > > mandatory? And why > > is it valid to make them all optional? > > > > > > Bert, > > > > Sorry for prolonged silence - was sick and then took me > > time to get through the e-mail piles. > > > > Here's my review of COPS-06, please forward it to the > > appropriate AD and WG chair(s). > > > > ================================================== > > cops-06.txt > > > > GENERIC COMMENTS. > > > > I'd prefer the following important issues described > > somewhere: > > - key provisioning (how the initial/first keys > > get in); > > - key management/update; > > - key requirments. What kind of keys are accepted? > > Public Key in X.509 format only? Anything else? > > Any reason why neither symmetric keys nor > > password-based methods (such as SRP, or what's in > > SSL) are there? > > - policy - how it gets there, how it's processed, > > what it looks like, etc. Something comparable to > > VACM of SNMPv3... > > > > I found the text on Access Control exceedingly muddy/unclear. I'm > > coming from reasonably good understanding of Access Control, but > > shallow knowledge of COPS. Request rephrasing (and maiing it > > CLEARER). > > > > Excessive use of abbreviations (PEP, PDP) without defining them > > in this document doesn't help. > > > > Otherwise the document is OK, notwithstanding the following. > > > > SPECIFIC COMMENTS. > > > > 3.2.1. So is at least one protocol mandatory? And why is it valid > > to make them all optional? > > > > 4.4. I'm not sure server (in the last case) should be allowed to > > just proceed establishing insecure connection. Perhaps better if > > the client decides how to proceed? > > > > PDP implementations MUST NOT require use of access control?! I'm > > violently against this prohibition. > > > > 8. Forcing to choose between insecure and X.509 PKI infrastructure > > is unfair and improper. Recommendation: support Web of trust, > > possibly other... > > > > PDP hostname availavle via Access Control mechanism? I don't > > understand - please clarify. > > > > 9.1. And the point of backward compatibility with old insecure > > implementations is...? > > > > References. RFC2748 is not of January 200 (unless it's a part > > of Gospel?). > > > >