RE: WG chair on buffer exhaustion
"Jim Pinkerton" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rddp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <E6564B8F86852D46A4E98C485FB33B8F03AFA8FE@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> |
I agree that the security draft should focus on requirements, not on implementation details. I'll try to draft something up to be reviewed by this group that doesn't choose one implementation over the other. Jim -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Caitlin Bestler Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 6:59 AM To: Culley, Paul Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: Re: [rddp] WG chair on buffer exhaustion On Tuesday, July 22, 2003, at 08:29 AM, Culley, Paul wrote: > As pointed out earlier in this thread, the mechanism that returns > "credits" for the "hard limit" can become an additional burden for > implementations, depending on how that is done. A "loose" credit check > and/or update can significantly reduce that burden. As covered earlier on the list, I disagree that this is an unreasonable burden on the iWARP implementation. The only thing required is a simple credit count for each DDP stream endpoint However, Pat Thaler's post did raise legitimate scenarios where maintaining such a count would be an imposition on the local ULP. While I do not believe they represent a typical strategy, they are valid. So my suggestion is that the drafts move in the direction of being permissive as to the *mechanism* by which the limit is enforced. The security draft should note that use of a "soft" mechanism requires the local ULP to account for that softness and have sufficient slack to absorb the delay. I'll point out that a "soft" credit check combined with sequential ordering can require absorbing a *lot* of slack. But if a given local interface *can* work, then there is no reason not to allow it. Security drafts should provide guidance on how to evaluate the impact of a specific interface without enumerating them. Focusing on the two questions of *when* an invalid MSN is detected and when a buffer is bound to an MSN provides this type of analysis tool that should be applicable to any local interface. The goal should remain that accepting an untagged message with an invalid MSN should never put handling of a valid untagged message at risk -- especially when the valid untagged message is part of a different session. (A "session" for these purposes is a set of DDP Streams that serve the exact same set of masters. That is, if a fault on Stream X impairs Stream Y, there is no party that has a complaint because at the application layer Stream X and Stream Y do not represent distinct interests. Generally, a session is a single stream.) But I believe that goal can be stated without prescribing *specific* methods of achieving it. Caitlin Bestler - [email protected] - http://asomi.com/ _______________________________________________ rddp mailing list [email protected] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp