RE: RDDP-enabled iSCSI "hole"
"Somesh Gupta" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rddp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
David, Why are you assuming that there is a separate iSCSI CRC above and beyond the RDDP CRC? I assume that use of iSER implies use of RDDP CRC. And in this case, the hole is pretty big, whether the STags are single-shot or not. Somesh > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]On Behalf Of > [email protected] > Sent: Sunday, June 06, 2004 1:41 PM > To: [email protected]; [email protected] > Subject: [rddp] RDDP-enabled iSCSI "hole" > > > Uri, > > > I'd like to chime in on this important discussion. I'm sorry, > > but I do fail to see the "new" security hole. > > Here's a scenario where long-lived RDDP STags cause a potential > iSCSI security "hole" that can't occur with single-shot STags or > in the absence of RDDP. I'm going one step beyond Somesh and > assuming that the iSCSI data CRC is still being used with RDDP > (in contrast to Somesh's assumption that the RDDP CRC(s) > replace(s) the iSCSI data CRC - that assumption opens the "hole" > wider because the RDDP CRC is checked earlier): > > (1) An STag is used to transfer data for an iSCSI write. > The STag is left valid after the data is transfer so > that the initiator and target can reuse this buffer > and its STag for the next write (a fairly obvious and > desirable optimization). > (2) The iSCSI target checks the received data against the > iSCSI CRC. The check succeeds, so the target code > requests a local disk write operation from the buffer > that is still exposed via the STag > (3) Before the write operation takes place, a TCP packet from > the MITM attacker (e.g., connection hijacker) shows up > and uses the STag to overwrite part of the write buffer. > > At this point, there is corrupt data headed for the disk. In > the absence of long-lived STags, the TCP packet at step (3) > gets rejected by RDDP. In the absence of RDDP, that TCP packet > gets through, but won't corrupt the iSCSI write data. Hence > RDDP's long-lived STags have opened up a new security problem. > > This problem appears to be generic to any reuse of a write > buffer and its associated STag. If an application protocol > uses RDDP to transfer data that is actually interpreted by > the application protocol, there are versions of this attack > that target protocol functionality if the implementation > contains code that assumes the contents of the receive > buffer don't change. > > Thanks, > --David > ---------------------------------------------------- > David L. Black, Senior Technologist > EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA 01748 > +1 (508) 293-7953 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786 > [email protected] Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754 > ---------------------------------------------------- > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On > > Behalf Of Uri Elzur > > Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 9:56 PM > > To: Somesh Gupta; [email protected] > > Subject: RE: [rddp] IPsec and RDDP as a transport > > > > > > Somesh > > > > If a packet is hijacked, what will prevent the CRC match??!! > > So why will > > the iSCSI over TCP data not be accepted? CRC has no cryptographic > > value... > > > > Uri > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On > > Behalf Of > > Somesh Gupta > > Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 6:28 PM > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: RE: [rddp] IPsec and RDDP as a transport > > > > > > It seems that for iSCSI specifically, RDMA writes icrease the > > possibility of data corruption, even with 'one-shot' STags. Consider > > iSCSI over TCP, with header and data CRC. If a random TCP > > packet is used > > to attack the connection, and the packet is accepted (large windows > > etc), the CRC checks will fail and the problem detected before a > > corruption occurs. > > > > Now consider iSCSI using iSER over RDDP. iSCSI depends on RDDP for CRC > > checks. An attack on the connection (out of order RDMA writes) could > > place data in the write buffers and if this happens, the attack will > > never be detected. > > > > Maybe this problem is iSCSI specific only. > > > > Somesh > > _______________________________________________ > rddp mailing list > [email protected] > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp