Re: Why IPsec is needed for iSCSI but might not be needed for RDDP/iWARP

On Jun 8, 2004, at 1:54 PM, John Hufferd wrote:

>
> David,
>
> Perhaps you could explain again for me and perhaps some other "dense" 
> folks why
> IPsec would be a MUST implement (but optional to use) for iSCSI but we 
> are
> attempting to not say similar things for RDMA/iWARP.
>
>

There are several valid distinctions between RDDP and iSCSI. David's
response detailed one. Some others:

- iSCSI as a new protocol is replacing non-IP networks and/or direct
   connections. The security vulnerabilities inherent in IP are therefore
   totally new. RDDP is an enhancement layer to the transport, it is
   replacing/enhancing that existing transport. Therefore it is only
   responsible for the security vulnerabilities that it *adds*.

   If it was unsuitable for an application to run over unsecure TCP,
   it will remain unsuitable for it to run over unsecure RDDP.

- It is difficult to imagine a scenario where tampering with
   iSCSI payload would not have an adverse potentially persistent
   impact. RDDP could be used by ULP that are immune to any
   persistent side affects from data tampering. Successfully
   inserting data into a real-time voice transimission, for
   example, is highly unlikely to do anything more than generate
   noise or perhaps force a disconnection (and a MITM-attacker
   can always force a disconnection even with authentication).