RE: Some RDDP attacks
"Talpey, Thomas" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rddp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
DDP depends on ordering as well as reliability. So UDP (the ultimate silent drop :) would be a double challenge. Not that I want to go there. The "traditional" model is the only one we need, IMO. What data-intensive protocols run by default over unreliable, unordered transport? Tom. At 09:34 AM 7/8/2004, Jim Pinkerton wrote: > >Abstracting it up a level, the current DDP/RDMAP IDs require a reliable >transport protocol underneath them. For example, the DDP ID is titled "DDP >over Reliable Transports". Silent drop is effectively corrupting the >reliable transport. > >Back when we were originally creating the DDP/RDMAP drafts, we spent a lot >of time trying to decide on whether the protocol was generic enough to run >over reliable and unreliable transports. When we dove in to it, there were >significant issues that were unique to the approach of running over an >unreliable transport (what is the programming model, how are completions >handled when things are lost, resolving holes in sequence space, etc). The >group was primarily interested in nailing reliable transports, since that >has been the traditional RDMA programming model. Thus the draft title got >"... over Reliable Transports" added to it to explicitly state the original >author's focus. > >I believe since the IDs were adopted by RDDP, that there has been wide >support for a focus on reliable transports as the first protocol suite to >come out of RDDP. Unreliable can come later. > > > >jim > > > > _____ > >From: [email protected] on behalf of Talpey, Thomas >Sent: Thu 7/8/2004 4:17 AM >To: [email protected] >Subject: Re: [rddp] Some RDDP attacks > > > >At 02:50 PM 7/5/2004, [email protected] wrote: >>I think that's actually indicative of a DDP problem, in that the current >>DDP draft is too quick to close a connection when receiving anything it >>doesn't expect. Mandating "silent drop" rather than "tear down the >>connection" would make this attack significantly harder to pull off. > >Silent drop would be a disastrous choice for DDP errors, especially >bad MSN or invalid STag! This would be like TCP ack'ing a hole in >sequence space or bad checksum. It would give the upper layers >on both sides of the connection an indication that messages had >been received when they had not. > >Consider an RDMA Write with bad STag that was dropped at the >receiver. The subsequent Send, signalling the receipt, would then >pass upwards. Oops. Or consider a sender exceeding its credits >and losing a string messages in the middle, but not the end, of a >sequence. > >Because it's an ack-less protocol, the only valid response DDP can >make is to send a Terminate and close the connection. Which it must. > >Tom. _______________________________________________ rddp mailing list [email protected] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rddp