RE: DDP/RDMAP Applicability
"Caitlin Bestler" <[email protected]> Thu, 20 Apr 2006 09:19:36 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rddp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <54AD0F12E08D1541B826BE97C98F99F143A7DD@NT-SJCA-0751.brcm.ad.broadcom.com> |
Derek Atkins wrote: > I was asked to review the DDP/RDMAP specifications. Here are > my comments on draft-ietf-rddp-applicability-05.txt > Typos noted and fixed. Thanks. > > ---- > ---- > > Section 6.6 : Data Integrity Implications > > CRC32 helps protect against accidental data corruption, but > not intensional data corruption. An attacker could easily > intentionally corrupt the data and a CRC32 cannot detect > that. I recommend some stronger wording that an active > attacker could easily subvert the CRC32, or at least > additional text that explains that CRC32 only protects > against accidental data corruption and not intensional data > corruption. > Clarification on the types of corruption will be added. > ---- > > Section 9 : Security considerations > > The discussion of the steering tag doesn't discuss what > information is exposed, or how guessable these tags could be. > What's the implication of a "peer" guessing at random STags? > Could I get data that I shouldn't have access to? Are these > STags tied to a particular peer session, and if so how? > A paragraph will be added to emphasize that STags must be validated for use on a connection. Therefore there is a set of advertised buffers that a peer can access, and those are the *only* buffers that the peer can use. There is no "guessing" involved. However there is no way for the RDMA layer to know that the peer has not *confused* which of the buffers it is authorized to use and has specified the wrong one. > -- > > There's no discussion of peer authentication. How do I know > who I'm talking to and how do I authenticate and authorize > their RDMA access? > > ---- > > Section 9.2 : Tagged Buffer Exposure > > This section does not go into enough detail of what can > happen if an attacker can insert random (or worse, non > random!) data into arbitrary buffers. We've got so many > buffer overrun attacks. Imagine what could happen if an > attacker didn't need to overrun a buffer but could co-opt the > RDMA and insert arbitrary data into buffers directly. > Language will be added emphasizing that random data placed into advertised buffers must be handled by the ULP, just as sending arbitrary data over a non-RDMA connection must be detected and handled up the ULP.