Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-09
Emre Ertekin <[email protected]> Mon, 21 Sep 2009 10:38:03 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.gen-art,gmane.ietf.rohc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi David, > As long as the possibly weak security mechanism is > addressed in the framework draft and there's text in this draft > pointing to the framework draft's security considerations, the > result should be ok. This sounds like a good way to proceed forward! Thanks again for your review. BR, Emre > Thanks, > --David > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Emre Ertekin [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 12:20 AM >> To: Black, David; [email protected]; [email protected]; >> [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] >> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; >> [email protected] >> Subject: RE: Gen-ART review of >> draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-09 >> >> Hi David, >> >> Thank you for reviewing our drafts. Please find our responses below. >> >> > Comments: >> > >> > The draft does not use RFC 2119 keywords (e.g., MUST), but the >> > draft is clearly written with clearly stated requirements, so >> > the authors' non-use of RFC 2119 keywords is not a problem. >> >> Thanks for pointing this out--actually, another reviewer requested >> that we include these keywords as well. Therefore, we decided to >> include them in the next release of the draft. >> >> > Figure 2 is confusing; it would be better to separate it into >> > two ASCII diagrams, one each for the AF=0 and AF=1 cases. For >> > AF=0, tilde (~) characters should be used in the vertical sides >> > of the ROHC Attribute Value box to indicate that the value >> > is variable length. >> >> I feel that the figures/description provided are pretty >> straightforward for IKE implementers, as they are identical to the >> figures/description presented in Section 3.3.5 of IKEv2 [RFC 4306] and >> the IKEv2bis draft. However, if you feel that it is necessary to >> separate these figures, I'm happy to entertain further discussion >> here. >> >> > In Section 2.1.2, the discussion of ROHC Profile neglects to >> > say where the profile numbers come from. It looks like they >> > come from the IANA registry for ROHC Profile Identifiers: >> > http://www.iana.org/assignments/rohc-pro-ids/rohc-pro-ids.xhtml >> > That should be stated. >> >> Sounds good, I can add a statement with this reference. >> >> > Truncating an integrity algorithm's output via use of a >> > ROHC_ICV_LEN value that is less than the algorithm's normal >> > output size weakens the security protection of that integrity >> > algorithm. That needs to be noted as a security consideration >> > in Section 3. >> >> Although I agree with the intent of your comment, I do not think that >> this causes a security consideration for IKE. However, I would like >> to add text in the companion ROHCoIPsec framework draft >> [draft-ietf-rohc-hcoipsec] that speaks to your point. Is this alright >> with you? >> >> > The last sentence of the description of the MRRU attribute is: >> > >> > If MRRU is 0 or if no MRRU attribute is sent, no >> > segment headers are allowed on the ROHCoIPsec channel. >> > >> > What's a segment header? Please add a sentence or two to explain. >> >> Sure; I'll add a reference to Section 5.2.5 of RFC 3095. >> >> > idnits 2.11.13 ran clean after correctly guessing that this >> > draft is intended for Proposed Standard status. >> >> Ok! Thanks again. >> >> Best Regards, >> Emre >> >> > Thanks, >> > --David >> > ---------------------------------------------------- >> > David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer >> > EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA 01748 >> > +1 (508) 293-7953 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786 >> > [email protected] Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754 >> > ---------------------------------------------------- >> >> >