[saag] Re: [Ext] Re: draft-paulwh-crypto-components-02

Michael Richardson <[email protected]> Fri, 21 Feb 2025 14:32:34 -0500

Newsgroups	gmane.ietf.saag
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

Wang Guilin <[email protected]> wrote:
    > However, such a quick switching actually does not give good protection
    > for the data exchanged before the flaw in the PQ algorithm is
    > found. So, an even more conservative hybrid solution is to have 1
    > traditional algorithm combined with 2 PQ algorithms, with a few more PQ
    > algorithms in store as back up. So, in the case either of the 2 PQ
    > algorithms is found insecure, a new back up PQ algorithm can come to
    > replace. Theregore, the data exchanged before flaw is found could be
    > protected well.

It could be that there are no secure quantum-safe algorithms.
That all the candidates will fail.   Maybe someone will get a Fields Medal
for proving this...  Perphaps it will fall out of someone prooving the
Reinmann Hypothesis.  I dunno.

Maybe the surviving algorithms will be too big to run more than once daily
between "enterprises, and we'll need to use it to bootstrap/maintain Kerberos
KDC<->KDC communications only.

We had a side meeting in Bribane on "SKEX", which was a way to distribute
symmetric keys from multiple providers.  I'm unclear why it didn't get more
feet.  It was very similiar to Kerberos, but outward facing rather than
enterprise internal.

So, I'm saying, if you are paranoid enough to think we need 2 quantum-safe
(PQ) algorithms, then let me suggest maybe we actually need some other backup.

--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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