[saag] Re: [nasr] Re: Initial thoughts on NASR
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.saag |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
(Also without expressing a broader opinion on NASR yet...) On 15/03/2025 12:04, Michael Richardson wrote: > 2) Capture Now, Decrypt after the CRQC concerns. Some of this might be FUD, > but some of the concern is real. Some of this has made into national > regulators. Yes, this includes Traffic Analysis attacks. > So keep the "bad guys" from collecting the traffic in the first place. The place it makes sense to try address this attack is at the same place where the classical encryption is being done via the kinds of hybrid KEM/KEX work already well underway for TLS, SSH, OpenPGP, etc. Trying to address this specific threat at a different layer from the classical encryption seems bogus to me - you'd never know whether or not you've solved the problem as the classic ciphertext might appear somewhere else to be recorded. So this issue should be scratched as a justification in this context. Cheers, S. _______________________________________________ saag mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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