[saag] Re: [nasr] Re: Re: Re: Initial thoughts on NASR

On Sat, Mar 15, 2025 at 7:23 AM Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
wrote:

>
> (Also without expressing a broader opinion on NASR yet...)
>
> On 15/03/2025 12:04, Michael Richardson wrote:
> > 2) Capture Now, Decrypt after the CRQC concerns.  Some of this might be
> FUD,
> >     but some of the concern is real.  Some of this has made into national
> >     regulators.  Yes, this includes Traffic Analysis attacks.
> >     So keep the "bad guys" from collecting the traffic in the first
> place.
>
> The place it makes sense to try address this attack is at the same
> place where the classical encryption is being done via the kinds of
> hybrid KEM/KEX work already well underway for TLS, SSH, OpenPGP, etc.
>

Precisely.

-Ekr

>
> Trying to address this specific threat at a different layer from the
> classical encryption seems bogus to me - you'd never know whether or
> not you've solved the problem as the classic ciphertext might appear
> somewhere else to be recorded.
>
> So this issue should be scratched as a justification in this context.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
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