[saag] Re: A short-lived WG for HPKE
Richard Barnes <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.saag |
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| Message-ID | <CAL02cgQLLV7FSD7W=uuXxziCuYGfw6y_RPJNMJDU4FZB0zq2+g@mail.gmail.com> |
Thanks for the edits, John. Mostly agree, will get this reflected in the next revision. Re: Listing the new algorithms in the charter -- I think this is actually an important constraint to have in the charter. We're going to have to make a decision as to which combinations to do, either now or in the WG, and it seems better to go ahead and get it over with. If there's a lot of energy for more options, rechartering is possible. On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 6:02 PM John Mattsson <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, > > > > I think this sounds like a very good idea. Some comments on the proposed > charter: > > > > OLD: semi-static > > NEW: static > > > > RFC 9180 talks about static keys. I don’t think that there is anything > stating that they are short-lived. > > > > --- > > > > - “Re-publish the HPKE” > > I think “Publish” might be better word given that there is quite a lot of > potential changes. > > > > --- > > > > - “Differences between the Standards Track version of HPKE and the > Informational version (RFC9180) should be minimized.” > > I think this could be removed. There are quite a lot of suggested changes, > and I think clarifications and new security considerations should be in > scope. The sentence “The Standards Track and Informational versions must > have identical behavior for any functionality that they both specify.” > clearly states where we do not want any differences. > > > > --- > > > > OLD: “Define PQ algorithms for HPKE from among the following” > > NEW: “Define algorithms for HPKE, for example > > > > KDFs based on SHA3 are not typically called “PQ” even if they are PQ. I > don’t have anything against the items in the list, but I am not sure that > the charter should limit the the group to only define these combinations. I > think the WG should update the already registered X-Wing, ML-KEM-1024, > ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-512 to point to a standard track RFC. I think it is good > that the charter does not mention any specific KEM combiner. CFRG RFCs > might not be ready in time, and I this is clearly something IETF can do anyway > (likely with review from the CFRG crypto panel). > > Cheers, > > John > > > > > > *From: *Nick Sullivan <[email protected]> > *Date: *Wednesday, 19 March 2025 at 17:38 > *To: *Richard Barnes <[email protected]> > *Cc: *IETF SAAG <[email protected]> > *Subject: *[saag] A short-lived WG for HPKE > > Hi Richard and Martin, > > Thank you for putting together a thoughtful and focused proposal. Speaking > as CFRG co-chair, I don’t see any conflict between this proposed WG and the > CFRG. > > Having a group like this solves a difficult problem for us: figuring out > how to do maintenance and updates on RFC 9280 as an IRTF research group > when the research questions around HPKE are effectively solved. > > Specifying HPKE codepoints based on PQ and Hybrid KEMs also seems > unproblematic. This is tricky work, but the CFRG is working on a document > to provide sensible advice to anyone who wants to safely combine KEMs ( > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-03). It > would be mutually beneficial to continue developing this document in > coordination with any work that goes on in this HPKE group in this area. > Doing so should help improve the group’s confidence in any concrete > constructions it chooses to specify and improve our document’s usefulness > to the IETF. > > Furthermore, the Crypto Panel ( > https://wiki.ietf.org/group/cfrg/CryptoPanel) can be made available to > IETF groups looking for cryptographic advice. We’d be happy to work with > the chairs of this proposed group on developing a streamlined process for > providing concrete feedback on documents it produces that have fully > realized security considerations sections. > > Nick > > P.S. The CFRG has also been working on a document containing advice for > authors of cryptography specifications which could be useful to anyone > writing specifications within this group ( > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-cryptography-specification/ > ). > > > > On Wed, Mar 19, 2025 at 4:53 PM Richard Barnes <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hello IETF security folks, > > At the CFRG session earlier this week, it became clear that the HPKE > protocol is in need of some maintenance, so Martin Thomson and I wanted to > propose a short-lived working group to make the required changes. > > HPKE (RFC 9180) documents a format that is widely used in IETF protocols. > This was a product of the CFRG in the IRTF, so it is an Informational RFC. > > HPKE is basically sound, but we think that there are a few things we could > to improve it: > > 1. Republish it as Proposed Standard. It is already a recognized downref, > so this is not about making it easier to cite, but we think that it would > be worth having IETF consensus for it. > > 2. Fix errata. There are enough (5 Verified, 2 HFDU, 1 Reported) to make > it a good time to do that. > > 3. Add some PQ algorithms. The MLS WG has identified a set of five KEM > arrangements, both hybrid and pure PQ, that cover a wide array of use > cases. Unlike other protocols, HPKE is used in multiple places; the > proposed charter suggests taking all five. There may be some additional > KDFs to define, if there is a desire to use SHA3 due to its presence in > ML-KEM. > > We are also suggesting that maybe some adjustments are necessary, given > experience with HPKE usage: > > * Removing the Auth and AuthPSK modes. Our understanding is that these > are not widely implemented or used, and they don’t appear to be supported > by any post-quantum KEMs. > * Making the changes necessary to add cipher suites with sponge form KDFs > like SHA-3/SHAKE that don’t have discrete extract and expand phases. > > The goal would be to maintain 100% compatibility with existing usage, > where the revised HPKE overlaps with that existing definition. Obviously, > removed features could continue to use RFC 9180 and new stuff would only be > able to use the new definition. > > Proposed charter text follows. Comments welcome! > > Thanks, > --Richard and Martin > > --- > > HPKE Publication, Kept Efficient (hpke) Working Group Charter > > Hybrid Public Key Exchange (HPKE) [RFC 9180] defines an authenticated > encryption encapsulation format that combines a semi-static asymmetric key > exchange with a symmetric cipher. This format is used in several IETF > protocols, such as MLS [RFC 9420] and TLS Encrypted ClientHello > [draft-ietf-tls-esni]. The fact that HPKE is defined in an Informational > document on the IRTF stream, however, has caused some confusion as to its > usability, especially with other standards organizations. And there are > currently no “post-quantum” (PQ) KEMs defined for HPKE, in the sense of > algorithms that are resilient to attack by a quantum computer. > > The hpke Working Group is tasked with two responsibilities: > > 1. Re-publish the HPKE specification as a Standards Track document of the > IETF, with targeted changes based on experience with its use: > * The working group may decide to apply any errata filed on RFC 9180. > * The working group may decide to remove functionality that is not > widely used (e.g., the Auth and AuthPSK modes). > * The working group may define how KDFs that are not two-step might be > used with HPKE. > > 2. Define PQ algorithms for HPKE from among the following: > * New KEMs based on hybrid combinations of ML-KEM and ECDH (ML-KEM-768 > with X25519, ML-KEM-768 with P-256, and ML-KEM-1024 with P-384) and > standalone ML-KEM (ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024). > * New KDFs based on SHA3 > > Differences between the Standards Track version of HPKE and the > Informational version (RFC9180) should be minimized. The Standards Track > and Informational versions must have identical behavior for any > functionality that they both specify. > > The group might select a number of cipher suites that address different > use cases, security levels, and attacker threat models. > > Deliverables: > 1. HPKE specification to the IESG as Proposed Standard (yesterday) > 2. New post-quantum and post-quantum/traditional hybrid cipher suites for > HPKE to the IESG as Proposed Standard (the day before that) > > > > _______________________________________________ > saag mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ saag mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]