[saag] Using a MAC instead of a cryptographic hash can lead to vulnerabilities
Deirdre Connolly <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.saag |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAFR824wwPd0HK4O+snkr1v9TRQ8D3b=U9xiicXCJh8+rB1DwWw@mail.gmail.com> |
On the question in the meeting just now of help with using HMAC, which work for that I think is a good idea, there was a reply of registering it as a 'hash' in places in the IETF which handles them: this is a category error that has security implications. A message authentication code (MAC) is not a cryptographic hash, especially in regards to it being keyed, and using a MAC when you actually need to use a hash can lead to vulnerabilities: https://bughunters.google.com/blog/5424842357473280/zen-and-the-art-of-microcode-hacking I am not aware of any IANA registry in I*TF that registers MACs, or if one is necessary. Perhaps guidance documents from CFRG or elsewhere would be helpful, RFC2104 is pretty tight on this score. Cheers, Deirdre _______________________________________________ saag mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]