[saag] Re: NASR BOF Follow-Up

Hi all,

We will continue to track and actively address the issues raised on NASR BoF, for convenience, I have brought the Q&A record to the email list.
Welcome to continue discussing with those who are concerned about these issues.

Q1: Why is not end-to-end protection sufficient and why should we care about where the traffic goes through?
Q2:  Why this is important to assure at the network layer?
Q3: List actual concrete examples of existing regulations.
Q4: List the technical requirements in detail.
Q5: NASR being a possible way to address pervasive traffic monitoring threats?

Q6: Proof of transit does not imply that the packet didn’t exit the path. ---->PoNT is out of scope.

Q7: There is work about proof of transit that has been done in SFC, what is needed to highlight what is not there (in routing, RATS, SFC PoT) which NASR will provide.-->
NASR is the joint use of attestation techncology and proof of transit.

Q8: What about lawful interceptions?---->
Trustworthiness as defined in RATS can attest that a router does what is supposed to do, including lawful interception if it is what it is supposed to do.

Q9: There is work from RATS, like RFC 9684, that can be used in NASR. Why an independent effort? Why not putting this work in an existing WG?---->
RATS is the building block to create path attestation, whose usage is then verified with proof of transit. These two things together look out of the scope of RATS. NASR does not want to replace RFC 9684, but rather leverage it.

Q10: What is exactly the definition of a path in NASR? BGP session? Tunnel? physical links?---->
A document in PANRG has a good definition of what a path is.

Q11: Trustworthiness and traffic engineering are already addressed in different places, so what is new in NASR? ---->
The possibility for the customers to verify that the traffic has been engineered in the way they asked. How to do it is the gap NASR wants to fill.

Q12: Candidate solutions from problems exist in other venues (Routing security / SFC)---->
True, but they do not address the combination (forwarding).

Q13: Proposed work may result in fragmentation of the Internet, including and excluding poeople?---->
No. That is the wrong terminology to use. NASR is about path complaint to a set of claims. Is a specific service in a limited domain not a general service for the Internet.

Q14: Clarification of requirements whether the requirement is to detect nodes along the path that do not support NASR?---->
No. Only have proof that traffic went through a set of nodes that support NASR.

Q15: Bringing the work to RATS would not work. RATS is already bloated and bringing all this work there is not possible.

Q16: PoT has cryptographic cost.--->
Implementation on SRv6 shows that the cost is very limited.

Q17: Remark about the scope of implementation: Internet or limited domain?--->
limited domain implemented at the operator level.

Q18: Need to verify every configuration (binary / configuration files / routers) in order to determine the properties of the path?--->This is not how remote attestation works. There is no configuration shared, the configuration is attested through trusted third party. You share hash values that attest the the property.

Q19: Why not doing this in the SFC WG?---->Piece can be done in other WG, but from a global perspective wold be better to have a WG.

Q20: For reliability, what about having multiple paths? Can it be a scalability issue? ----Yes, the attribute of multiple path is included.

Best,
Meiling
 
From: Liuchunchi\(Peter\)
Date: 2025-03-29 19:19
To: [email protected]; IETF SAAG
CC: [email protected]
Subject: [saag] NASR BOF Follow-Up
Hi NASR, SAAG,
 
Thanks everyone for participating and contributing valuable feedbacks to the NASR BOF last week! Thank you Nancy and Luigi for mediating a productive discussion, and thanks Deb for supervising the process.
 
During the process, we had extensive discussions that showed both major interests in the problem and differing understanding of the objective. For example, NASR represents new use case requirements that aim to extend Remote Attestation benefits to the network scale, providing more comprehensive security visibility and behavioral assurance across network deployments to the customers. But NASR is not intended, in any capacity, to serve as a substitute for end-to-end encryption technology, etc. 
 
The poll result shows a clear consensus that this is an IETF problem, but a rougher (at best) or no consensus that the problem is well understood. 
 
To help on that, next steps we will work on a dedicated document that collects all valuable feedbacks from the BOF and resolve them one-by-one. Again, we sincerely thank everyone who contributed valuable feedbacks and cares about bringing more security and transparency to networks!
 
Best regards,
Peter (Chunchi) Liu

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