Re: sacred again
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sacred |
|---|---|
| Organization | Baltimore Technologies Ltd. |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Lawrence, Now that I've found the expired SASL SRP draft (I found it at http://www.forge.com.au/products/Papers/Secure_Remote_Password.htm), and re-read rfc2222, I tend to agree with you and Bob. The sasl-srp draft does include a security layer. So - in the (probably likely;-) absence of further inputs, I'll try to draft up a protocol with beep+sasl+sasl-srp+sacred-messages-in-xml and we can then see whether it meets the requirements in rfc3157. Regards, Stephen. Lawrence Greenfield wrote: > > Many SASL mechanisms support security layers. > > This is covered in RFC 2222. > > If the SRP mechanism doesn't define a security layer, it should be > fixed. SACRED has no business defining its own security layer. > > SASL security layers work today; they're supported by IMAP, SMTP, and > LDAP servers. (Some of the SASL mechanisms with security layers are > GSSAPI and DIGEST-MD5.) > > Larry > > Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 16:45:03 +0100 > From: Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> > > Radia, All, > > I've started drafting the SRP protocol stuff & am including SRP in > the sacred payload, (as opposed to using the SASL SRP mechanism), > similar to how PDM was handled in the previous draft. Radia raises a > point where I'd like some feedback from the list (actually, I'd like > feedback from the list about *anything* at all:-) > > Radia Perlman - Boston Center for Networking wrote: > > > [...] > > I thought that it could be done without > > any work on Sacred's part by just saying "use any SASL mechanism", > > and the most work I thought sacred would have to do is to say that > > the one mandatory SASL mechanism was RFC mumble (which would be SRP). > > Though maybe SASL-SRP is still just an internet draft, but that > > wouldn't make any difference. > > > > Radia > > You mean that SASL-SRP does mutual auth and key derivation and that > (SRP derived) key is then used to encrypt & integrity-protect all > subsequent BEEP traffic. That'd be nice all right, problem is how > is the SRP-derived key used to do that? > > Be great if BEEP itself took care of this, but AFAIK it doesn't > (Marshall - would that be a general BEEP thing, using a SASL derived > key to protect traffic where the SASL mech derives a suitable key?) > > So, if I'm right, that'd mean that we'd have to define our own payload > encryption and MACing, where needed. It seemed to me that at this > stage we're not getting much from the use of SASL and so I included > the SRP stage in the payload from the start (arguably better from a > layering approach I guess). > > Hence the drift of the current (proto-)draft. > > Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716 39 Parkgate Street, fax: +353 1 881 7000 Dublin 8. mailto:[email protected] Ireland http://www.baltimore.com