Re: beep+sasl+srp draft issues
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sacred |
|---|---|
| Organization | Baltimore Technologies Ltd. |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Dale, > > - We want to hash the userid in case the user types her > > password into the "username" box. We could do this above > > SASL-SRP or else could try get the SASL-SRP draft to include > > the trick itself (I prefer the latter). Any opinions? > > preference 1) skip it. do appropriate UI checking in the client > > preference 2) send in hash(user-id) as part of SASL-SRP authenticated login > sequence. Ok - that's three opinions (more?) > > - The sacred-pdm draft had an "extra" rsa private key which > > was used for signing credential uploads - do we want to > > maintain this feature? (The reason for it was to make > > it harder to benefit from stealing the server's database.) > > Defeats one benefit of any strong-pw protocol which requires nothing to be > preconfigured in the client. It didn't require that. The idea was that the client generated the key pair on the fly - the private being stored as an encrypted part of the credential & the public being a clear part of the credential. A client can then sign a credential upload & the server can verify off-of the previous instance of that credential. > > - SASL-SRP makes it easy to authenticate and derive keys for > > credential download, changes etc, but what about initial > > registration? Is that to be offline only or do we need > > to have a credential deposit operation that uses some other > > "in-payload" security? > [...] > I'd be inclined to stick with that for now although I can see the benefit of > some type of self-registration feature. That's the one I'm on about. > > - The sacred-pdm draft had some notes about "away-from-home" > > operation, which is harder using SASL (unless we put the > > SASL PDUs in our payload as Magnus suggested). Do we want > > to support this & if so, how? > > Seems like an unnecessary complication. > > Why can't the roaming user access the target credential server directly? > Clearly, she can access lots of other things directly. Probably can - if you know its name/address and there's no f/w in the way. For someone roaming around inside an intranet both are issues (e.g. when I'm in our Boston office). Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716 39 Parkgate Street, fax: +353 1 881 7000 Dublin 8. mailto:[email protected] Ireland http://www.baltimore.com