some comments to version 7 of the CARD draft
Marco Liebsch <[email protected]> Fri, 30 Apr 2004 20:36:35 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.seamoby |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
James, thanks for editing the latest CARD draft to address IESG comments. Please find below some comments. marco ---- section 4. CARD protocol operation end of 3rd paragraph refers to a RESOLVER ERROR. This status code is associated only with a L2-ID, not with a signaling message. Proposal to modify: "The current AR returns replies based on its CAR table (see Section 4.1), and returns a L2-ID with a status code indicating RESOLVER ERROR (see Section 5.1.3.1) if this particular L2-ID cannot be resolved. (if this is meant with your new text here) ---- section 4. CARD protocol operation 6th paragraph: "The MN can additionally request from the AR a certificate chain..." Same as above, the RESOLVER ERROR status code is available only in a L2-ID sub-option. Proposal A: Add a similar status code indication in a Trusted Anchor sub-option, which could come back to the mobile and indicate that no cert chain has been found for the trausted anchor. Proposal B: Remove the RESOLVER ERROR indication here. Furthermore, the trusted anchor sub-option should not have a Context-ID, since this anchor is associated with a mobile terminal, not with a CAR. So, here it makes no sense. last paragraph: correct typo: "...The peer returns a CAR/+D+/ Reply message..." This paragraph breaks the two paragraphs about use of the Requirements and Preferences sub-option. Proposal: Move it to one paragraph later, where the examples about Requirement and Preferences finish. ---- 4.3.1 Current Access Router Operation end of first paragraph: "An AR uses SCTP for CARD transport..." Well, there is a dedicated section (5.2.1 Protocol Transport). Use of SCTP is new, maybe important, maybe too heavyweight. Since there is already 5.2.1, it should not be mentioned too often... Proposal: Delete this reference to SCTP here. end of 2nd paragraph: "The receiving AR MUST increment the sequence number of the CARD by one in the CARD Reply" Isn't it better to use the same sequence number in the Reply as received in the Request to allow the requesting entity to associate the Reply to a previiously sent request? This was actually the case in previous version. Here, I cannot say to which IESG comment this kind of modification is related. ---- 4.4 MN-AR Transport This looks inconsistent and sections on protocol transport should be covered either by chapter 4 or 5. Now it is split. Proposal: Move this section to 5.1.1, similar to how it is done for the AR-AR transport in 5.2.1. Why has the retransmission scheme and the assocated protocol constants changed? Use of exponential bakoff is ok. These changes, I cannot associate with any IESG comment. ---- 5.1.1 CARD Main header format Text about Valid Options: "Router Certificate: ...in the chain for the AR or for a CAR from a trusted anchor to the router..." Shouldn't the cert be sent to the mobile? ---- 5.1.3 Sub-options format Table about interfaces: Why is the Trusted Anchor sub-option used on the AR-AR interface? I think it's used only between a MN and its AR. Propoal: Remove the X for this interface (if my assumption is correct) ---- 5.2.1 Protocol Transport UDP has been entirely replaced by SCTP. Well, I saw John's mail about interoperability, but SCTP looks quite heavyweight in some cases, at least if capability parameters are updated very frequently. Proposal: Shouldn't we add a paragraph that says: Other transport protocols might perform better in some cases, but appropriate failure recovery mechanisms must be specified if not implicitely supported by this transport protocol... Use of SCTP has been proposed on the list, but cannot be associated with any IESG comment. ---- 5.1.3.6 Trusted anchor sub-option As said above, use of a Context-ID is not required here. Proposal: Remove Context-ID ---- 5.1.3.7 Router Certificate Sub-option This is probably the most critical issue: The TLV-encoding of this option indicates length as units of octets. Maybe 254 bytes are not really sufficient for a certificate. Proposal: Difficult, if we change length unit to "units of 8 octets", this might conflict with the overall length indicator of the CARD Request/Reply, which is also in units of 8 octets. ---- 6.3 General question w.r.t the protection of MN-AR CARD messages: If CARD Reply messages are authenticated using the SEND signature, how are CARD Requests authenticated by the ARs?