Re: Proposal and intent to implement "dsa-sha2-256" SSH key algorithm
Jeffrey Hutzelman <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 03:03 +0000, denis bider wrote: > Hey Jeffrey, > > thank you for your comments. :-) > > I have updated the draft based on this feedback. Same URL - new version: > > http://www.denisbider.com/draft-dsa-sha2-256.txt Those updates all look good. > > If you don't include it, then either implementors will > > support it anyway, or users will be confused when their > > keys don't work. > > I've done some testing, and found that Windows CNG cannot import an > L=2048, N=224 private key generated with Crypto++. > > In the interest of interoperability, I think it's better to prohibit > this option. I have added language to this effect. > > I assume that with N=224, you'd want to actually use SHA-224. > > It may be interesting to note that Windows built-in crypto - a major, > FIPS-certified platform - does not support SHA-224 at all. With DSA, or > standalone. > > For that matter, what about _larger_ key sizes? > > What's to say that NIST won't publish FIPS-186-5 > > with an (L=4096, N=512) option. > > Allowing for such keys to be used with the same algorithm name would > break interoperability with applications unaware of such a new > standard. I don't understand. The issue with ssh-dss was that we _didn't_ allow for larger key sizes. Well, that and the fact that we specified SHA1, which doesn't provide sufficient security to keep up with larger key sizes(*). So why would it be bad to support larger key sizes with an existing hash that is already big enough? (*) In fact, now that I think about it, we probably should have defined an rsa-sha256 public key algorithm.