RE: OpenSSH sabotages protocol extension
Peter Gutmann <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4B56EDD@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> |
denis bider <[email protected]> writes: >What possible purpose does this serve? It's perfectly sensible, if the spec requires that a packet be x, y, z then getting a packet containing x, y, z, extra garbage is at best a sign of data corruption, at worst a sign of an active attack. Rejecting the packet and closing the connection is good practice, it makes it harder for an attacker to use you as an oracle. For an example of what happens if you do ignore extra garbage at the end of your data, look at the padding attacks on PKCS #1... Peter.