Re: Updated RSA SHA-2 draft / New draft: SSH Extension Negotiation
Damien Miller <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Sun, 8 Nov 2015, denis bider wrote: > (1) I have uploaded a new version of the RSA SHA-2 draft: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-02 Some feedback on the draft: > 1. Overview and Rationale The DSA bits in here don't seem very relevant. Could I suggest ditching them or putting them in an appendix? > All aspects of the "ssh-rsa" format are kept, including the encoded > string "ssh-rsa", in order to allow users' existing RSA keys to be > used with the new signature formats, without requiring re-encoding, > or affecting already trusted key fingerprints. I can see the argument for keeping "ssh-rsa" as the key name and another name for the revised signature format. I'm not entirely sure about it, I guess because I'm used to there being an identity between key types and signature types in the SSH protocol. > 3. Discovery of signature algorithms supported by servers > > When a public key format can use multiple signature algorithms, it can > be useful for a mechanism to exist which a client can use to discover > signature algorithms accepted by a server for user authentication > without resorting to trial and error in authentication requests. > > Such a mechanism is defined in [SSH-EXT-INFO], which describes general > purpose extension negotiation for SSH, and specifies discovery of > signature algorithms as a usage case. IMO a "publickey2" (or somesuch) method that included a custom failure message to list the supported key types seems like a better way to offer this. > Public Key Algorithm Name Reference Note > rsa-sha2-256 [this document] Section 2 > rsa-sha2-512 [this document] Section 2 As mentioned in my other email, I don't feel super-strongly about naming, but "rsa-pss-sha2-*" seems slightly more descriptive and future-proof. Is it worthwhile to specify a minimum key size for the new signature schemes? -d