Re: DH group exchange (Re: SSH key algorithm updates)
[email protected] (Niels Möller)
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
"Mark D. Baushke" <[email protected]> writes: > For now, does it seem reasonable to add RFC 3526 group15 & group16 to > the protocol? > > diffie-hellman-group15-sha256 (3072-bit MODP group ~130 bits of security) > diffie-hellman-group16-sha256 (4096-bit MODP group ~150 bits of security) I think it makes sense. It's good to have some specified algorithms with security a bit beyond what's currently used, to make it easy to move if/when needed attacks on the current algorithms emerge. Next question is what status they should have. I think it makes sense to have group15 as RECOMMENDED. (By the same argument, I think it makes sense to specify some alternative to sha256 too, which I guess would be either sha512 or sha3-384 (sha384 makes litte sense to me, since it's essentially a truncated sha512, with same performance and shorter output)). Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid C0B98E26. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.