Re: draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2-01 (was Re: DH group exchange)
"Mark D. Baushke" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Folks, > URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2 I just noticed that the Information Assurance Directorate at the NSA has a new article on 'CNSA Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ' ... their URL is https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/ia-solutions-for-classified/algorithm-guidance/cnsa-suite-and-quantum-computing-faq.cfm Reading the document, they are mandating that NSS no longer use Diffie-Hellman with 2048-bit keys instead they are suggesting IETF RFC 3526 (Groups 15-18). They are also no longer interested in using SHA-256 wanting SHA-384. For folks interested in compliance with the CNSA Suite, does it make sense for the baushke-ssh-dh-gorup-sha2 ID to be updated to specify either SHA-384 (or possibly SHA-512)? That is change from this: Key Exchange Method Name Note diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 NOT RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group15-sha256 RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group16-sha256 OPTIONAL to this: Key Exchange Method Name Note diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 NOT RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group15-sha384 RECOMMENDED diffie-hellman-group16-sha384 OPTIONAL diffie-hellman-group17-sha512 OPTIONAL diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 OPTIONAL I am suggesting sha512 for group17 and group18 as a minor bit of future-proffing and/or performance trade-off for sha512 hardware acceleration that may exist. Comments please? -- Mark