Re: AEAD in ssh
Watson Ladd <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CACsn0ckZWasrUMNknUaOjHz6KRW3+aH=V3qeYC5H4-781OLWeg@mail.gmail.com> |
On Feb 23, 2016 10:41 AM, "Niels Möller" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Bryan Ford <[email protected]> writes: > > > I can understand that position. However, one potentially > > counter-balancing consideration is that the introduction of new > > AEAD-based ciphersuites inherently introduces a new, > > wire-protocol-incompatible “record format” anyway that needs to be > > negotiated. > > I agree, but at least it's only a different per-packet transformation. > Having to guess future packet sizes or emit extra packets is much more > than a new record format. I don't think it's a good tradeoff, too much > new complexity for little benefit. > > My understanding is that cleartext length fields are believed to be > secure, in that the only thing leaked are message boundaries. And hiding > them using a separate stream cipher is a simple way to stop that leak > (and the benefit of doing that is under debate). In particular, the even > simpler alternative, to apply the AEAD to the 4-byte length field, > including authentication, seems like overkill. > > I think simplicity is essential for making progress here, if we go for a > design of ssh version 3, discussion will never end. > > > Deferring useful record format changes until the next major protocol > > version, > > I don't expect any need for a new major version of the ssh protocol for > the next one or two decades. It's not too painful to add aead support > (and all other additions of new algorithms have been smooth, as far as I > can tell). There already is a widely used SSH implementation with AEAD support. Copy what they do. > > Regards, > /Niels > > -- > Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid C0B98E26. > Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.