RE: rsa-sha2-256/512: handling of incorrect signature encoding
Peter Gutmann <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4CDF9D6@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> |
denis bider (Bitvise) <[email protected]> writes: >What type of “advertising SHA-2” do you mean? If the server advertises rsa- >sha2-256 or -512 for server authentication, then it also needs to have an RSA >host key. But the server might not have an RSA host key, it might only have >an ECDSA or Curve25519 host key. I was thinking of it in an opportunistic-upgrade sense, for example for PGP and S/MIME the mandatory algorithm is SHA-1 but if you receive a message signed with SHA-2 you can switch to that because the client will be able to process it. So if you see ecdsa-sha2... or rsa-sha2... in the keyex then you know the other side can do SHA2, and should do the auth with SHA2 as well. >In this situation, the server cannot advertise an rsa-sha2-XXX algorithm for >host authentication. It's not so much can it do RSA-SHA2, but can it do SHA2 in general rather than SHA1. Peter.