draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
Tero Kivinen <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.curdle,gmane.ietf.secsh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Mark D. Baushke writes: > Key Exchange Method Name Reference Note > curve25519-sha256 ssh-curves MUST > diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 RFC4419 SHOULD NOT > diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 RFC4253 SHOULD NOT > diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 RFC4253 SHOULD > diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 new-modp MUST > diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 new-modp SHOULD > ecdh-sha2-nistp256 RFC5656 SHOULD > ecdh-sha2-nistp384 RFC5656 SHOULD > ecdh-sha2-nistp521 RFC5656 SHOULD > gss-gex-sha1-* RFC4462 SHOULD NOT > gss-group1-sha1-* RFC4462 SHOULD NOT > gss-group14-sha1-* RFC4462 SHOULD > gss-group14-sha256-* new-modp SHOULD > gss-group16-sha512-* new-modp SHOULD > rsa1024-sha1 RFC4432 SHOULD NOT (I remove algorithms with status of MAY, to make it shorter). That looks mostly ok. Most of the sha1 -> SHOULD NOT, with exception to the diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and gss-group-14-sha1-*, which are still kept as SHOULD for backwards compatible reasons. The MUSTs are good, but there seems to be quite a lot of SHOULD versions. Is there really need for that many SHOULD algoritms. For example is there reason to keep ecdh-sha2-* as SHOULD when curve25519-sha256 will be MUST? Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement, and which are not). -- [email protected]