Re: Pub request for draft-ietf-sip-dtls-srtp-framework-03
Dean Willis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sip |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Sep 25, 2008, at 2:51 PM, Schneider, Peter (NSN - DE/Munich) wrote: >> > Allowing lawful interception does not imply allowing anyone to > intercept the communication. You must have access control for the > facilities that allow lawful interception. Compare this with the > authentication service described in RFC4474 (SIP identity). Who > controls that service, can mount a man in the middle attack that > cannot be detected by the means provided by DTLS-SRTP. Which is why DTLS-SRTP allows one to run the AS on the phone, and to verify the media-channel key fingerprint in voice or out-of-band. If you do this, you can (assuming your OS hasn't been hacked), detect MITM attacks to the extend currently provided for by our mathematics. That's a lot stronger than what you get by trusting the bored hourly worker down at the switching center. >> >> > Well, making DTLS-SRTP more adequate for 3GPP/TISPAN scenarios > (excluding lawful interception) without making it weaker would be a > good thing - better now? That sounds pretty reasonable :-). -- Dean _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [email protected] for questions on current sip Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip