Re: scope of derive
Dean Willis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sip |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Dec 8, 2008, at 11:10 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote: > > I think DERIVE is a viable approach for spoofing protection and I > haven't found > a convincing argument that would counter that really. We agree that a negative-DERIVE test means nothing. Therefore, DERIVE provides no spoofing protection. What it does do is potentially provide some assurance of non-spoofing. That's a very different thing. In short, the default condition for an astute user should be "The caller ID may or may not be valid". With negative-DERIVE, this doesn't change. With positive-DERIVE, the user should think "This caller-ID works for a return routability check. It is more likely to be valid than if I didn't have this test, but it might still be faked by a clever badguy". Otherwise said: Unknown, Claims-to-be, and Can-be-reached-now-at are the three possible states produced by DERIVE. Now, how astute do you think your hypothetical grandmother is likely to be? At the best, we can get three states to such a user: no ID, not trusted, and trusted to relatively high level. Those aren't the same three states that come out of DERIVE. So is it useful to your grandmother, or just confusing? -- Dean _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [email protected] for questions on current sip Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip