Re: scope of derive

Hadriel Kaplan wrote:

> 
> Actually, I would debate that.  Derive and other return-routability checks have the property of: "if I pass then you know I'm good, if I fail then you know nothing (neither good nor bad)".   I would argue such a property is only useful in voice communications if it passes and provides a positive/"good" result *frequently*.

Well, I don't think really this is specific to DERIVE -- most of 
communication technologies
are useful only if used frequently. (economists call it networking I 
recall). The starting
point is obviously zero, the key challenge is a growth strategy and I 
thinkt the key to it
is simplicity.


> 
> For example, if the odds of Derive passing is low in general, then Palin would have had to assume it *was* Sarkozy even if it failed.  Why?  Because she assumes it now, with no such checking, and the odds of this thing passing are low per the supposition.
> 

DERIVE can't do social engineering. DERIVE only verifies routeability. 
DERIVE helps
her to trust [email protected] if she knows it is a legitimate address. 
If she accepts
[email protected] with a positive DERIVE test, and dislikes she 
knows after fact
she can put the URI on a blacklist.


-jiri

> Therefore, if we feel the odds of a return-routability check succeeding is low in general, it is NOT the case that: "it greatly decreases the probability of a random radio DJ being able to make a prank call."
> 
> -hadriel
> 
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