Re: scope of derive
Dean Willis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sip |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Dec 8, 2008, at 1:22 PM, Jiri Kuthan wrote: > Dean Willis wrote: >> On Dec 8, 2008, at 8:49 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote: >>> Elwell, John wrote: >>>> [JRE] The number of negatives will diminish, true, but it will >>>> never >>>> approach zero, because there will always be negative cases >>>> arising from >>>> forking, call forwarding, problematic B2BUAs, etc.. >>> >>> indeed. >>> >>>> So it is a question >>>> whether it will get sufficiently close to zero that the odd false >>>> negative can safely be ignored. I am rather doubtful. >>> >>> The question remains: why would like to worry about the negative >>> case >>> when we know it has zero information value?? I cannot conceive >>> anyone >>> would like to use such non-information and I don't see the point in >>> studying it then. >> How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the positive >> case? > > That's a policy thing. Perhaps (as an example) increase a call > atempt score > beyond a threshold that will prevent the call from falling in > voicemail. > >> How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the negative >> case? > > not at all. > Well, the Security area wonks are going to want us to have a threat assessment. What is the risk? In what scenarios does it occur? What are the consequences? Given the threat assessment, we then need to understand how the solution impacts that threat. What are the possible ranges of policy? What is the recommended policy? How does it impact behavior in a system that uses this solution? -- Dean _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [email protected] for questions on current sip Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip