Re: draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00

Rafael and others,

Thanks for putting this together.

Considering for a moment figure 1, this attack is possible only if UAs 
accept incoming requests from any place, and not just their proxy. In 
practice, this is seldom allowed. Indeed, if it is allowed, there are 
worse attacks than this which can be launched (free phone calls, spam 
calling, etc.). Using the SIP recommended TLS between UA and proxy also 
mitigates that.

So really figure 2 is the interesting one. However, this attack assumes 
that Alice has credentials on multiple systems. Again, in practice, this 
is extremely uncommon. Certainly none of the existing deployed 
enterprise or service provider consumer deployments are of this nature.

As such, I dont think this attack is likely in practice. However, in 
theory it is possible. The essence of the attack is that the victim is 
providing credentials to an unauthenticated server (since the attacker 
is acting like a server, asking for credentials). In that way, as others 
have pointed out, it is similar to baiting attacks that have been 
previously documented. With SIP it is most easily remedied by a rule 
which says, 'don't pass credentials for domain X to a server that is not 
domain X'. Server identity can be verified by normal server-only auth 
between a client and its server, but even that is not needed. A client 
will know which domain its proxy is representing, and once connected, it 
only provides credentials for that domain.

-Jonathan R.


Raphael Coeffic wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> a new internet draft has been published concerning the relay attack on 
> digest authentication and SIP. The attack itself has been first 
> disclosed 2 years ago by the maydnes team from the french INRIA. Until 
> now, no document has been pushlished that documents the attack and 
> provides guidance to SIP operators or handset manufacturers.
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
> 
> The appropriate mitigations of problem resolutions are still not 100% 
> clear. We hope that this draft can help start a discussion on how to 
> best resolve this problem.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Raphael Coeffic.
> (on behalf of all the authors of this draft)
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
> 
> 
> Filename:       draft-state-sip-relay-attack
> Version:       00
> Staging URL:       
> http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/staging/draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00.txt 
> 
> Title:           SIP digest authentication relay attack
> Creation_date:       2009-03-02
> WG ID:           Indvidual Submission
> Number_of_pages: 18
> Abstract:
> The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP [RFC3261]) provides a mechanism
> for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more
> participants.  This document describes a vulnerability of SIP
> combined with HTTP Digest Access Authentication [RFC2617] through
> which an attacker can leverage the victim's credentials to send
> authenticated requests on his behalf.  This attack is different from
> the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and does not require any
> eavesdropping, DNS or IP spoofing.
> 
> 
> 
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-- 
Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D.                   111 Wood Avenue South
Cisco Fellow                                   Iselin, NJ 08830
Cisco, Voice Technology Group
[email protected]
http://www.jdrosen.net                         PHONE: (408) 902-3084
http://www.cisco.com
_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol
Use [email protected] for questions on current sip
Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip