Re: francois' comments and why RFC4474 not used in the field
Dean Willis <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sip |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mar 30, 2009, at 11:59 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote: > Dean Willis wrote: >> On Mar 28, 2009, at 3:02 PM, Jiri Kuthan wrote: >>> >>> >>> I'm worried this is only a wishful thinking. While perfectly >>> logical, still even in such constrained setups some bizzar >>> ALGs do in my experience appear in the middle, change SDP >>> and make thus the identity worthless. >> If they change the SDP, they've changed the identity assertion. >> They need to re-assert. There might reasonably be a need to have a >> stack of assertions with diffs, so one could go back and see the >> original SDP, with its original key fingerprint and original >> verifiable signature, but just changing stuff and pretending the >> associated identity assertion hasn't changed is fundamentally bogus. > > My argument has been that including SDP's IP address and port numbers > in message integrity check is not an identity assertion, but a > protocol > shortcoming (certainly well-meant, but making things hard to deploy). > I really think that identity and integrity of SDP are two different > things. > > Or do you think that these elements somehow belong to identity > assertion? The argument has been made that these elements might provide additional clues to identity. For example, if I see something that is coming from what I know is your IP address, and see that it was signed by your proxy, whose cert I trust, I might be inclined to believe this assertion more than I would believe it if the source address were coming from a node that had a reverse record in alqueda,org. In the absence of a DTLS or zRTP protection of the media path, I'd be likely to give fairly heavy weighting to this IP address comparison, even though we know it's not 100% it is MUCH better than nothing. Of course, I'd rather have an identity mechanism that actually works with DTLS than one than doesn't but "works just a little" for unprotected media. So personally, I'd be willing to give up signing of IP address/port numbers when a media key fingerprint is present. But if there's no media key fingerprint in the signaling (or in the protocol, as zRTP), then I want to see the address and port numbers included. -- Dean _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [email protected] for questions on current sip Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip