Re: francois' comments and why RFC4474 not used in the field

Dean Willis <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.sip
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On Mar 30, 2009, at 11:59 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:

> Dean Willis wrote:
>> On Mar 28, 2009, at 3:02 PM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm worried this is only a wishful thinking. While perfectly
>>> logical, still even in such constrained setups some bizzar
>>> ALGs do in my experience appear in the middle, change SDP
>>> and make thus the identity worthless.
>> If they change the SDP,  they've changed the identity assertion.  
>> They need to re-assert. There might reasonably be a need to have a  
>> stack of assertions with diffs, so one could go back and see the  
>> original SDP, with its original key fingerprint and original  
>> verifiable signature, but just changing stuff and pretending the  
>> associated identity assertion hasn't changed is fundamentally bogus.
>
> My argument has been that including SDP's IP address and port numbers
> in message integrity check is not an identity assertion, but a  
> protocol
> shortcoming (certainly well-meant, but making things hard to deploy).
> I really think that identity and integrity of SDP are two different  
> things.
>
> Or do you think that these elements somehow belong to identity  
> assertion?

The argument has been made that these elements might provide  
additional clues to identity. For example, if I see something that is  
coming from what I know is your IP address, and see that it was signed  
by your proxy, whose cert I trust, I might be inclined to believe this  
assertion more than I would believe it if the source address  were  
coming from a node that had a reverse record in alqueda,org.

In the absence of a DTLS or zRTP protection of the media path, I'd be  
likely to give fairly heavy weighting to this IP address comparison,  
even though we know it's not 100% it is MUCH better than nothing.

Of course, I'd rather have an identity mechanism that actually works  
with DTLS than one than doesn't but "works just a little" for  
unprotected media.

So personally, I'd be willing to give up signing of IP address/port  
numbers when a media key fingerprint is present. But if there's no  
media key fingerprint in the signaling (or in the protocol, as zRTP),  
then I  want to see the address and port numbers included.

--
Dean

_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol
Use [email protected] for questions on current sip
Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.