Re: Using TLS in the first hop - Bug in RFC 5630
"DRAGE, Keith (Keith)" <[email protected]> Thu, 15 Sep 2011 19:05:49 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.sip |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <EDC0A1AE77C57744B664A310A0B23AE220C0DC0D@FRMRSSXCHMBSC3.dc-m.alcatel-lucent.com> |
Addressing the thread in general rather than Hadriel in particular. Please remember that RFC 5630 did not set out to create a complete solution= to secure communication. That was left to separate work and noone at the t= ime seemed interested in doing that next step, so it was abandoned. What RFC 5630 set out to do was to define what occurred if you followed the= RFC 3261 mechanisms, and to correct some of RFC 3261 that was known to be = wrong and to attempt to make sure that if SIPS was used in the Request-URI,= then TLS was used end to end. I do not believe there was ever an intent to= try and control what happened hop by hop. If you know that TLS is being us= ed on the local hop, but have absolutely no knowledge of whether it is bein= g used anywhere else, how useful is that? While section 5, the normative section appears somewhat long, if you look a= t the impact of RFC 5630 in the way it changed RFC 3261 as stated in append= ix A, it actually did very little in terms of change to the original RFC 32= 61 material. I'm not actually sure that the issue you point out in 3.1.3 actually impact= s the above drastically. Do note however that if you want to perform new work, you probably need to = take it to the SIPCORE list. Keith > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of > Hadriel Kaplan > Sent: 15 September 2011 17:31 > To: I=F1aki Baz Castillo > Cc: <[email protected]>; Olle E. Johansson > Subject: Re: [Sip] Using TLS in the first hop - Bug in RFC 5630 > = > = > Oh I'm well aware of that. :) > I assumed this whole discussion was theoretical. > In *practice* using sips is tough. Some systems don't support it and will > choke on the scheme, while some systems seem to ignore the extra "s". And > there are real problems with it even if you do everything by the book. > For example, it's not like Alice's UA will actually have a TLS cert to be > able to be a TLS server/listen-socket, so you can't open a TLS connection > to her UA regardless, ever. And with TCP in general you have to treat her > Registered Contact connection as an outbound-style flow (ie, like an > alias'ed connection-reuse), even if the UAC doesn't indicate RFC 5626 nor > 5923. Once you do that, using "sip" instead of "sips" contact works, or > has so far for us. YMMV. > = > -hadriel > = > = > On Sep 15, 2011, at 12:03 PM, I=F1aki Baz Castillo wrote: > = > > 2011/9/15 Hadriel Kaplan <[email protected]>: > >> No I mean if Bob wants to Refer Carol to Alice, or Alice to Carol > (since that Refer can be sent out of dialog to Alice's contact). > > > > Initial requests sent to a Contact address rather than being sent to > > an AoR are always problematic. The same occurs in attended trasfer > > when the REFER is sent within the dialog and contains a Refer-To with > > the endpoint Contact URI. Such URI could be no reachable if it's > > between some kind of NAT's (regardless the user used STUN). > > > > -- > > I=F1aki Baz Castillo > > <[email protected]> > = > _______________________________________________ > Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip > This list is essentially closed and only used for finishing old business. > Use [email protected] for questions on how to develop a SIP > implementation. > Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip. > Use [email protected] for issues related to maintenance of the core SIP > specifications. _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is essentially closed and only used for finishing old business. Use [email protected] for questions on how to develop a SIP = implementation. Use [email protected] for new developments on the application of sip. Use [email protected] for issues related to maintenance of the core SIP spec= ifications.