Re: [pkix] Initial inquiry: Signed vCards
"Jim Schaad" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.smime |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Y = MAC(message, KeySymmetric) Sig = Sign(message, KeyPrivate) Both generate an output that can be verified. In the case of a signature algorithm, the recipient uses a public key to verify the signature. In the case of a MAC algorithm, the recipient uses the same symmetric key for verification as was used for creation. Jim > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On > Behalf Of DataPacRat > Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2013 1:20 PM > To: Jim Schaad > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [smime] [pkix] Initial inquiry: Signed vCards > > On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 3:57 PM, Jim Schaad <[email protected]> > wrote: > > I may be missing something, but I do not see how using a MAC function > > is going to provide any degree of security in this case. > > > > The basic presumption of using a MAC function is that the secret is > > known only to two people. The generator and the consumer. If it is > > known to multiple people, especially if it is advertised in a URL, > > then a new MAC value can be created by anybody that can get the secret > > value and a new vcard substituted. > > From Sean Turner's suggestion, I assumed that 'output of a HMAC' was > effectively a synonym for 'the authentication hash generated by the relevant > key's algorithm'. If that's not the case, such as only applying to email rather > than encryption in general, then that change may need to be changed. > > > Thank you for your time, > -- > DataPacRat > "Then again, I could be wrong." > _______________________________________________ > smime mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/smime _______________________________________________ smime mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/smime